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Warren K. Urbom*
Toward Better Treatment of Jurors
By Judges
"I sniff and guess ... I pick things out of the wind and air."1
I. INTRODUCTION
Old judicial customs die hard. When the bones that hold a cus-
tom upright collapse, judges build artificial ones and put them in
place. When the lungs rattle and the breathing labors, judges do
the breathing themselves, as though the custom's life were sacred.
The tenacity of judges in their heroic measures is a source of
wonder.
The origins of jury treatment are obscure, but customs that
grew up early persist, propped up by old or new assumptions
about human behavior. Three of these customs and their assump-
tions are the subjects of this Article.
Jurors stand in a place of significance in our system of justice.
Their judgment of the truthfulness of witnesses, of the compara-
tive strength of competing evidence, and of the validity of the sub-
tleties of arguments by counsel is generally given immunity from
attack. Yet, customs rationalized by distrust of jurors to do simple
and natural tasks remain alive in many courts. Taking notes, ask-
ing questions, and receiving written instructions are said to be be-
yond the capacity of the people who must walk through the
intricacies of fact and law to decide on the guilt and liability of
other people. This Article suggests that jurors can ably handle all
three of these often-forbidden acts, because the reasons for dis-
trust are based on "sniff and guess."
II. JURY NOTE-TAKING DURING TRIAL
A. Existing Legal Authority
The American jury system calls upon jurors to be the triers of
fact. Fulfillment of this duty requires jurors to recollect countless
* Chief Judge, The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska.
A.B., 1950, Nebraska Wesleyan University; J.D., 1953, University of Michigan.
1. Carl Sandburg, Wilderness.
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details of evidence they have heard during the trial on subjects
with which they have had little or no familiarity before the trial. It
should come as no surprise that even the shortest of trials may tax
a juror's memory of specific details. The problem reaches aston-
ishing proportions in trials which last weeks or months and encom-
pass voluminous amounts of evidence.
A sensible method to assist jurors in remembering details for
use in deliberations is to permit them to take written notes while
evidence is presented. As sensible as this solution may seem, it
has met with mixed reactions by the judiciary. The extremes in
appellate case law run from outright prohibition to affording the
trial judge complete discretion.
The Indiana Supreme Court dealt with the matter as early as
1871, reversing a criminal conviction because a juror disobeyed the
trial judge's order to cease taking notes. 2 The court stated that ju-
rors should record evidence "on the tablets of [their] memory and,
not otherwise." 3 However, Indiana courts thereafter exhibited a
lessening resistance to the practice, culminating in the approval of
note-taking in 1970.4 Pennsylvania has retained a prohibition on
juror note-taking, which is set out in a rule of criminal procedure.5
Other jurisdictions give jurors a legal right to take notes. Some
states grant this right by statute6 or court rules.7 The Georgia
Supreme Court has held that jurors have the right to take notes,
even though the right is not declared by statute or rule.8
Most jurisdictions have steered a middle course by leaving the
2. Cheek v. State, 35 Ind. 492 (1871).
3. Id. at 495. The Indiana court may have overstated its case somewhat inCheek because in a case decided one year later, Cluck v. State, 40 Ind. 263
(1872), the court refused to reverse a decision where there had been no in-
struction by the trial court for jurors not to take notes and the defendant had
not objected to jurors taking notes. Cluck thus seems to constitute an early
retreat from an absolute per se prohibition of note-taking to requiring an ob-
jection. See Comment, Taking Note of Note-Taking, 10 CoLum. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 565, 584 (1974).
4. See Dudley v. State, 255 Ind. 176, 181-82, 263 N.E.2d 161, 164 (1970); see also
Comment, supra note 3, at 584-85.
5. PA. R. CRIm. P. 1113. See also LA. CODE Civ. PRoc. ANN. art. 1794 (West 1961).
6. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 167 (West 1970); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 546.15 (1947);
MoNT. REv. CODEs ANN. § 25-7-404 (1981); NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.131 (1981);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-22-04(3) (1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-32-2 (1978).
7. See, e.g., Amuz. R. CIM. P. 18.6; COLO. R. Civ. P. 47(m); IowA . CRIM P.
18(7) (e); MINN. R. Cnam. P. 26.03 subd. 12; MD. R.P. 558, 757; UTAH R. Crv. P.
47(m).
8. Tift v. Towns, 63 Ga. 237, 242 (1879). See Lilly v. Griffin, 71 Ga. 535, 540 (1883)
(jurors allowed to take notes as of right as long as no substantial delay re-
sults). See also Petroff, The Practice of Jury Note Taking, Miscondu=4 Righ4
or Privilege?, 18 OKLA. L. REV. 125, 139 (1965).
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matter to the discretion of the trial judge. 9 That is true in the fed-
eral system, where the "sound discretion of trial judges"'O governs.
Judges have discretion in most jurisdictions to prohibit note-tak-
ing," to permit it on a limited basis,12 or to encourage it.'3
Allowing note-taking has been encouraged by the Judicial Con-
ference of the United States' 4 and the American Bar Association.15
The Commissioners on Uniform State Law have adopted a rule
permitting the practice at the discretion of the trial judge.16 The
American Bar Association's position is the strongest, allowing ju-
rors to take notes as a matter of right in Standard 15-3.2 of the
Standards for Trial by Jury.'7 Its position is based on the conclu-
sion that the advantages from note-taking outweigh the
disadvantages.18
Uniform Rule of Criminal Procedure 513(e) and Recommenda-
tion XX of the Judicial Conference Committee on the Operation of
the Jury System' 9 vest the trial judge with discretion to allow note-
taking but do not permit it as a matter of right to the jurors. Both
the Uniform Rule and the Recommendation were drafted to repre-
sent existing law in the majority of jurisdictions.20
9. See, e.g., United States v. MacLean, 578 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1978); Howard v. State,
583 P.2d 827, 835 n.19 (Alaska 1978); Travis v. Commonwealth, 457 S.W.2d 481,
482 (Ky. 1970); State v. Shedd, 274 N.C. 95, 104-05, 161 S.E.2d 477, 484 (1968);
State ex. rel Dept. of Highways v. Lehman, 462 P.2d 649, 650-51 (Okla. 1969);
Watkins v. State, 216 Tenn. 545, 562-63, 393 S.W.2d 141, 145 (1965); Manges v.
Willoughby, 505 S.W.2d 379, 383 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
10. United States v. MacLean, 578 F.2d 64, 65 (3d Cir. 1978).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Bassler, 651 F.2d 600, 601-02 (8th Cir. 1981); Martin v.
Bell Helicopter Co., 85 F.D. 654 (D. Colo. 1980) (in lieu of notes the judge
provided jurors with a weekly listing of the witnesses who had testified at
trial).
12. See, e.g., In re Appropriation of Easements of Hulbert, 16 Ohio Ops. 2d 465,
469-70, 176 N.E.2d 881, 883 (1961) (notes allowed during expert testimony
only); Maclin v. Homer, 357 S.W.2d 325, 328 (Ky. 1962) (jury allowed to take
down damages figures on a chart).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Standard Oil Co., 316 F.2d 884, 896-97 (7th Cir. 1963);
People v. Graves, 263 Cal. App. 2d 719, 739-40, 70 Cal. Rptr. 509, 523 (1968);
State v. Goldberg, 261 N.C. 181,208-09, 134 S.E.2d 334,353, cert. denied, 377 U.S.
978 (1964).
14. See Judicial Conference of the United States, The Jury System in the Federal
Courts, 26 F.D. 409, 424, 457-59 (1960) (Recommendation YX) [hereinafter
cited as Recommendation].
15. STANDARDS FOR CanVNiAL JUSTICE, TRIAL BY JURY, Standard 15-3.2 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as STANDARD].
16. Umri. R. CRiuv. P. 513(e) (1974).
17. STANDARD, supra note 15, Commentary, at 15-84.
18. Id. at 15-85.
19. Recommendation, supra note 14, at 424.
20. UNi. R. Cane. P. 513(e), Comment, at 244; Recommendation, supra note 14, at
458.
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B. Should Jurors Be Allowed to Take Notes?
As discussed above, the majority of jurisdictions vest trial
judges with discretion on the matter of juror note-taking. Such a
grant of discretion is best used by permitting note-taking in almost
all trial situations. An approach used succiessfully by the author as
a standard practice since 1970 is to furnish jurors with pencils and
note pads immediately after opening statements for use during the
trial. The jurors are instructed that they may make notes as they
choose during the trial and use them for their deliberations. The
note pads are kept locked in the jury room overnight and during
recesses. At the conclusion of the trial, the jurors are free to dis-
pose of their notes as they choose. If the notes are left with the
court, they are destroyed.
1. Advantages of the Practice
Allowing jurors to take notes and properly regulating the prac-
tice holds a number of advantages. A judge who has tried a com-
plex case cannot doubt the impossibility of anyone remembering
the evidence without help. A recent jury trial presided over by the
author entailed over 3500 exhibits and 10 1/ months of testimony
from 285 witnesses, involving dozens of different transactions.2 1
Neither the lawyers nor the judge nor the jurors could store that
amount of information for useful recall, and note-taking was an un-
challenged necessity.
Shorter, less complicated trials will also be served by the jurors'
taking notes. Memories are assisted, especially as to dates, statis-
tics, damage figures, and witnesses' interrelationships. Given the
nature of the memory process, 22 it is logical to conclude that reten-
tion is enhanced by the dual process of hearing and writing. Also,
a juror's role may be transformed from that of a passive to an ac-
tive listener, thereby increasing his or her attentiveness.
Perhaps the author's view, born of a dozen years' experience,
can be summed up this way: if there are reasons for note-taking by
lawyers and judges during a trial, there are at least the same rea-
sons for note-taking by jurors.
21. United States v. Phillips, No. 78-03382-01/22-CR-S-W-2 (W.D. Mo. 1980).
22. "Ordinarily, without rehearsal, short-term memory cannot retain anything
for more than a half minute or so.... New information held in short-term
memory can be kept alive if repeated or rehearsed." E. LoFrus, MEMORY, 19-
20 (1980). Writing what one has heard or one's understanding of what one
has heard may well be at least a repetition or rehearsal, helping to lengthen
the time the matter is likely to be kept in the memory and available for use.
[Vol. 61:409
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2. Problems and Precautions
a. Procedural Concerns
Juror note-taking is not without its potential problems, and pre-
cautions need to be taken to ensure avoidance of prejudice or im-
propriety. Some reported cases have involved the problem of
whether counsel or the court should take the leading role in per-
mitting jurors to take notes, if notes are to be allowed. As dis-
cussed above, the author instructs jurors at the outset of the
evidence in every case that they may take notes and provides pen-
cils and note pads. This practice ensures that jurors have note
pads with no extraneous material and eliminates the potential for
jurors to favor one side or the other because that side provided or
failed to provide writing materials. It is true, however, that some
courts have found that counsel's furnishing of materials does not
constitute reversible error.23
If the judge takes the initiative in providing note-taking materi-
als, it is wise to refrain from insisting that the jurors take notes at
any time. It has been hinted that the trial court's insistence that
jurors take notes, either on the entire case or on a certain portion,
constitutes reversible error.24 Some jurisdictions prefer that coun-
sel or the jurors request that the jurors be allowed to take notes
before the court provides materials,25 although that is not the case
in the federal system. 26
In every case where jurors are allowed to take notes, a prelimi-
nary instruction cautioning them as to the use of notes is advisa-
ble. At a minimum the cautionary instruction should recite that
notes are only to assist jurors in remembering details of evi-
dence.27 Some jurists prefer to add cautionary remarks to the ef-
23. See, e.g., Commercial Music Co. v. KIag, 288 S.W.2d 168, 172 (Tex. Civ. App.
1955). It is likely, however, that counsel's dictating to the jury rather than
merely furnishing them with writing materials may cross the bounds of pro-
priety and constitute reversible error if not corrected by the trial judge. See
Comment, supra note 3, at 572.
24. See, e.g., United States v. Standard Oil Co., 316 F.2d 884, 897 (7th Cir. 1963).
25. See, e.g., Corbin v. Cleveland, 144 Ohio St. 32, 34, 56 N.E.2d 214, 215 (1944).
26. Sea, e.g., United States v. Anthony, 565 F.2d 533, 536 (8th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Standard Oil Co., 316 F.2d 884, 897 (7th Cir. 1963); Waldrip v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 11 F.R.D. 426, 430 (WM). La. 1951).
27. The author uses the following instruction in preliminary instructions given to
the jury before opening statements:
You may take notes during the trial to assist you in remembering
details of evidence. When you retire at the end of a court day, leave
in the jury room the notes you have taken, the note pads, and the
pencils furnished to you. When you have reached a verdict at the
end of the trial, leave the note pads and pencils in the jury room and
dispose of your notes as you choose.
Listen carefully to everything that is said during the trial, be-
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fect that jurors do not need to feel obligated to take notes or that
notes are not entitled to any greater weight than recollections of
details by other jurors and do not constitute a verbatim transcript
of the testimony.28
b. Other Potential Problems
Other possible problems are perceived by some appellate
courts or trial judges. The seriousness of them is subject to grave
doubt.
In earlier times when a larger portion of the population was il-
literate, there may have been some valid concern that literate ju-
cause, although you will have the exhibits that will be received in
evidence, there will be no written transcript of the testimony for your
use. You may make notes, but you must rely primarily upon your
memory and your notes for recalling the testimony. In some in-
stances it may be possible, if necessary, during your deliberations,
for the court reporter to read back a part of the testimony of a partic-
ular witness, but that will be done only in rare circumstances.
Devitt and Blackmar suggest the following instruction:
The court will permit jurors to take notes during the course of this
trial, since there may be complicated issues in which the notes may
be helpful. You of course are not obliged to take any notes, and some
feel that the taking of notes is not helpful because it may distract you
so that you do not hear and evaluate all of the evidence. If you do
take notes please keep them in confidence between yourself and
your fellow jurors.
1 E. DEvrrr & C. BLACKmA, FED. JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 10.06 (3d
ed. 1977).
28. Judge Sorg used a more cautious instruction in the trial in United States v.
MacLean, 578 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1978):
A second matter that I think we can process is a request that was
made by one of the jurors having to do with taking notes. The taking
of notes by jurors has been frowned upon by many courts because of
the danger that in the course of the jury's deliberations such notes
may be given more significance than they may deserve. Also, it's
feared that while a juror may be taking notes on a particular point,
some very important items of testimony that follow may be over-
looked, the juror being preoccupied in recording impressions on a
particular point. It's my view, however, that if a juror wishes to take
notes which may help to refresh his or her own memory, particularly
when an indictment contains a number of counts and the testimony
of the witnesses is prolonged and it takes over an unusual period of
time, that the juror should be permitted to take such notes. I empha-
size, however, that such notes are not entitled to any greater weight
than the recollection or the impression of any other juror as to what
the testimony may have been or what the conclusions should be ar-
rived at and with that understanding the taking of notes by jurors
will be permitted. It is hoped that you will fully understand that they
are not official transcripts and may not cover points that are signifi-
cant to another juror, but if a juror wishes to keep his or her mind
refreshed as to the testimony in the case as it goes along, the Court
will not prohibit the taking of notes.
Id. at 67.
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rors would use notes to an unfair advantage over illiterate jurors.29
The problem is not of concern in the federal system, where an abil-
ity to read and understand the English language is a prerequisite
to jury service.30 In some jurisdictions, however, juries may con-
tain illiterate persons. This possibility should not automatically
ban juror note-taking, but should be a factor to be considered by
the trial judge in the particular case.
A modern offshoot of the literate/illiterate juror concern is the
attitude of some courts that good note-takers will dominate the
rest.31 Most courts have realized, when confronted with this issue,
that many factors affect a juror's ability to persuade others.32 Since
such a fear of juror dominance is merely based upon assumption,
reason hardly presses for banning note-taking. Aggressiveness,
speaking ability, confidence, and interpretive ability affect the im-
pact of one juror upon another. By what rationale is a judge to
decide that those characteristics are acceptable weapons of per-
suasion but that note-taking ability is not? Why is it better, as a
matter of law, for a jury to be dominated by good speakers than by
good note-takers?
Another expressed concern is that jurors may miss part of the
evidence while they are taking notes on another part.3 3 By missing
parts of the evidence, the jurors are viewed as having an incom-
plete picture of the case and thus are deemed unable to consider
the evidence as a whole.34 No doubt that is possible, but it is also
possible that lawyers and judges will miss part of the testimony by
writing notes about other parts. Should we then refuse to allow
lawyers and judges to take notes? Should a judge, therefore, take
no notes during a nonjury trial? It is as logical to answer yes to
those questions as to say that jurors cannot take notes because
they may miss something. No evidence has been found that hints
that lawyers or judges are better note-takers than jurors, and none
is likely to be found. It is also probably true that jurors are better
judges of their own note-taking skills than is the presiding judge.
Jurors today for the most part are people with enough education
and native intelligence to decide not only whether a litigant's free-
dom or property should be taken away but also what some judges
seem to view as a tougher issue-whether the jurors' taking notes
will help or hinder them.
29. See infra note 57.
30. See 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b) (2)-(3) (1976).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 103 F. 457, 470 (W.D. Tenn. 1900), aff'd, 107 F.
753 (6th Cir. 1901); Fischer v. Fischer, 31 Wis. 2d 293, 304, 142 N.W.2d 857, 863
(1966).
32. See Comment, supra note 3, at 578-79 and authorities cited therein.
33. See, e.g., Thornton v. Weaber, 380 Pa. 590, 597-98, 112 A.2d 344, 347-48 (1955).
34. Id.
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A related pair of problems is safeguarding the integrity of the
jurors' notes and disposing of the notes after trial. Several judges
have gone to considerable lengths to ensure that jurors' notes are
not tampered with from day-to-day during the trial. Some judges
require court personnel to collect writing materials at the conclu-
sion of each day.35 At least one has gone further by giving the ju-
rors separate envelopes containing note paper and instructing
them to seal the notes in the envelopes each night.3 6 A practice
that has worked well for the author is simply to require that the
jurors leave their notes and note pads in the jury room during all
recesses and overnight. Access to the jury room is limited to court
personnel, and the court is locked at night.
After safeguarding the integrity of the notes during trial, one
must ask whether the notes need to be retained after trial. At least
one court of appeals has recommended that trial judges retain ju-
rors' notes and include them with the record on appeal.37 If jurors
are allowed to talk freely to anyone about the trial after the verdict
has been received,3 8 it is difficult to understand why their notes
should be kept by the court, instead of allowing the jurors to dis-
pose of them or keep them. In a similar vein, some courts require
that notes be destroyed in the jurors' presence at the conclusion of
the trial.39 If jurors' written recollections of a trial are to be kept
secret, why then ever allow them to talk to anyone about the case?
C. Summary
Although historically there has been some uneasiness about ju-
rors taking notes during trial, the practice may be suitably allowed
in nearly every case. It is preferable that the trial judge provide
the jury with materials and instruct them that they may take
notes. The jury should be cautioned about the proper use of the
notes, and safeguards should be employed by the court to ensure
that the notes are not disturbed during trial.
For the most part, problems with note-taking perceived by ap-
pellate courts do not in reality present significant impediments.
No residue of distrust from a former time, when illiteracy was com-
mon, should control the modern trial. Jurors today are quite capa-
ble of finetuning their memories by note-taking when allowed to
exercise their own judgment in when to take notes. If in a particu-
35. See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 316 F.2d 884, 897 (7th Cir. 1963).
36. Corbin v. Cleveland, 144 Ohio St. 32, 34, 56 N.E.2d 214, 214 (1944).
37. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 316 F.2d 884, 897 (7th Cir. 1963).
38. See E. DEv=r & C. BLAcKmAR, supra note 27, § 5.25 and authorities cited
therein.
39. See, e.g., Corbin v. Cleveland, 144 Ohio St. 32, 56 N.E.2d 214 (1944).
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lar case genuine deficiencies of jurors are observable, the trial
judge's discretion should be available for control.
Safeguarding the integrity of jurors' notes during trials can be
accomplished with easy procedures in securing the materials. If
more stringent measures are necessary in a given setting, the trial
judge should be able to implement them without scuttling the
note-taking practice. The judge's aim should be to provide assist-
ance to the jurors, not to handcuff them.
III. QUESTIONING OF WITNESSES BY JURORS
A. Existing Legal Authority
Although jurors are called upon to decide issues of fact, the in-
formation upon which they are to base a decision comes in the
main from answers to questions posed by others. Counsel, while
questioning witnesses, may not ask, for whatever reason, ques-
tions that call for all the information deemed important by the ju-
rors for making a decision. As a result, jurors may become
frustrated, and that frustration may manifest itself in a verdict per-
meated with irritation toward one or more counsel or skewed by
what is perceived as a factual void.
Jurors may be allowed to ask questions to be answered by wit-
nesses. The existing legal authority dealing with the subject gen-
erally permits the practice. 40 Most jurisdictions leave the matter
to the trial judge's discretion.41 Jurisdictions which discourage the
practice generally do so upon the basis of fears that prejudicial and
inadmissible evidence will come into the trial42 or that counsel
who object to a juror's question may be disadvantaged by the ju-
ror's resentment at the objection. 43 In most cases where reversal
rests upon jurors' asking of questions, the grounds are improper
control over the procedure, not the procedure itself. As discussed
below, proper management by the judge will alleviate evidentiary
and other problems that accompany the allowing of questions by
jurors.
B. Should Jurors Be Allowed to Question Witnesses?
The preferable approach to questions by jurors is to permit
40. See Annot., 31 A.L.R3d 872 (1970) and authorities cited therein.
41. See, e.g., Nelson v. State, 257 Ark. 1, 513 S.W.2d 496, 498 (1974); Scheel v. State,
350 So. 2d 1120,1121 (Fla. App. 1977); People v. Heard, 388 Mich. 182, 187-88, 200
N.W.2d 73, 76 (1972).
42. See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 25 Ariz. App. 497, 499-500, 544 P.2d 714, 716-17 (1976);
Stinson v. State, 151 Ga. App. 533, 536, 260 S.E.2d 407, 410 (1979); Raynor v.
State, 1 Tenn. Crim. App. 556, 447 S.W.2d 391, 393 (1969).
43. See, e.g., Raynor v. State, 1 Tenn. Crim. App. 556, 447 S.W.2d 391, 393 (1969).
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questioning, while the judge maintains careful control over the
practice. A lack of adequate control can, as pointed out by Judge
Templar, "present some difficulty for the reason that the juror is
not an attorney and not familiar with the rules of evidence, and
might intentionally or inadvertently ask some question which is
hopelessly improper and which should not in any event be
answered." 44
An approach followed by the author with success and sug-
gested by other authorities 45 does not allow jurors to ask questions
directly of the witnesses.46 Instead, jurors must direct the ques-
tions to the judge. In turn, the judge decides whether the question
meets the legal rules and, if so, the judge puts the question to the
witness. If the question is not to be put to the witness, the judge
gives the jury a brief explanation of why the judge has ruled it out.
If there is any doubt as to the propriety of the question, the judge
calls counsel to the bench for a conference or hears from counsel
outside the presence of the jury. If questions by jurors are relayed
to and answered by a witness, counsel are then afforded opportu-
nity to examine and cross-examine the witness on the subject of
those questions.
1. Advantages of the Practice
A properly handled procedure for allowing jurors' questions ac-
crues obvious advantages. Basically, exploration of the facts is im-
proved. Counsel may have been insensitive to nuances or details
seemingly unimportant to them but of great interest to the jurors,
or counsel may have inadvertently left a subject untouched.
In a recent trial,47 counsel arranged with the judge's approval
for an examination of a railroad crane at a railroad site. During the
examination jurors studied what they had gathered from photo-
graphs in evidence to be the critical parts of the crane involved in
the plaintiff's fall from the crane. When given an opportunity to
ask questions, a juror asked whether the boom was then in the
same position as when the fall occurred. The author put the ques-
tion to the plaintiff, whose testimony had been interrupted by the
44. Proceedings of the Annual Judicial Conference, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Jury
Management During the Trial and Sequestration, 44 F.R.D. 245, 305 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Jury Management].
45. See, e.g., United States v. Callahan, 588 F.2d 1078, 1086 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 826 (1979).
46. The practice of allowing jurors to ask questions as employed by the author
may be viewed as the judge, not the jurors, posing questions to the witness.
The judge has long been empowered to question witnesses and that power is
now explicitly set forth in the Federal Rules of Evidence. See FED. R. EviD.
614(b).
47. Hogan v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., No. CV 80-0-447 (D. Neb. Apr. 9, 1982).
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viewing of the crane, and the answer was that it had been pointed
in the opposite direction. The boom then was rotated 1800 and the
jurors viewed the actual areas of the crane--different from those
they had been studying-from which the plaintiff had fallen. A
simple oversight of counsel was thus easily corrected by a juror's
question. Such an occurrence is not usual in the author's experi-
ence, but neither is it surprising or unique.
Furthermore, what may seem obvious to counsel, who have
been gaining familiarity with a case's factual matters for weeks or
months or years, may be obscure or incomprehensible to the jurors
without an explanation. Familiarity may lull counsel into not in-
quiring of a witness as to such matters, and the jurors may get the
explanation or clarification through a question prompted by them.
Allaying a juror's misdirected concern is also an advantage of
the practice. A question about an inappropriate subject affords the
judge an opportunity to deal squarely with the fact of inappropri-
ateness. In contrast, the juror's raising the matter during delibera-
tions in the jury room for the first time means the jury may
speculate on it or rail about the lawyers or one of them for failing
to provide information about it. The judge's stating that the sub-
ject is not to be taken into account has the prospect, at least, of
persuading the jurors not to speculate about it or blame counsel
for omitting facts about it. In short, allowing questions by jurors
tends to open the trial, whereby forbidden subjects can be de-
clared forbidden and can be treated, rather than be left to fester in
the jury room.
Fear that a juror will impregnate the trial with unwanted and
prejudicial material is unwarranted. The juror merely asks a ques-
tion; a question, however violative of the rules of evidence, has
scant potential in itself for mischief. The question may be readily
intercepted by the judge, and no answer will be heard. The same
is true whether the question is asked orally in open court or orally
at the bench or in writing. Permitting oral questions in open court
has not led to a single instance in the author's seven years of con-
stant use of the practice of prejudicial material being inserted into
the trial. To forbid the practice on the basis of frightful imaginings
is not to be commended.
One more advantage appears: when a question is asked, it may
well be a clue to counsel of a line of inquiry that needs to be made.
By giving counsel an opportunity to question the witness further
after the jurors' questions, counsel may be able to flesh out the
factual subject, as well as to rebut any misleading inferences aris-
ing from the axiswers to the jurors' questions.
If a worthy goal of a trial is to develop the truth through fair
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procedures, it is difficult to fault increased factual input from care-
fully monitored questions by the jurors.
2. Problems and Precautions
a. Procedural Concerns
Most-probably all--of the potential problems presented by al-
lowing jurors' questions to witnesses arise from procedural diffi-
culties. Some courts have noted that juror questioning could
interrupt the examinations of witnesses by counsel.4 8 Of course it
could, if permitted to, but it will not, if the jurors' questions are
allowed only after counsel have completed examination of a partic-
ular witness. Allowing follow-up inquiry by counsel after jurors'
questions rounds out the process to give counsel the last encoun-
ter with the witness.
A related issue is whether jurors should be able to question a
witness directly or only through the judge. Many of the cases dis-
playing uneasiness about juror questioning have done so in situa-
tions where jurors may question the witness directly.49 By
interposing the judge between the juror and the witness, a check of
the questions is installed and improper questions may be
intercepted.
The judge may intervene in a variety of ways. The author al-
lows jurors to ask questions in open court, but instructs that the
question be directed to the judge and that the witness not answer
the question until the judge has indicated approval. Ordinarily,
the question is restated by the judge, sometimes in a modified
form. A more restrictive approach is used by Judge Bruce Thomp-
son of the Superior Court in Ventura, California. Judge Thompson
requires jurors to write the questions and submit them to the
judge.50 The juror's identity is not disclosed to the witness or
counsel. After conferring with counsel and deciding whether the
question should be asked, Judge Thompson himself presents the
question to the witness.
An intermediate approach might be to take juror questions
orally but out of the presence of counsel and the witness. The
judge could then consult with counsel, if necessary, and submit the
question to the witness when the jury is reassembled.
Another concern sometimes present is whether the court on its
own motion may invite jurors to ask questions or whether coun-
sel's consent or request should be a prerequisite to the practice.
48. See, e.g., Pacific Improvement Co. v. Weidenfeld, 277 F. 224, 227 (2d Cir. 1921).
49. See, e.g., Raynor v. State, 1 Tenn. Crim. App. 556, 447 S.W.2d 391, 393 (1969).
50. Letter from the Honorable Bruce A. Thompson to the Center for Jury Studies
(Mar. 11, 1981).
[Vol. 61:409
JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF JURORS
As most cases rely upon the discretion of the trial judge, it would
appear that the courts of those jurisdictions have the power on
their own motion to initiate the practice. As with questioning of
witnesses by the judge, the judge should not become an advocate
by encouraging jurors to question any particular witness or about
any particular subject.51
Although generally the consent of counsel is not required for
the court to initiate juror questioning, it is helpful to inform coun-
sel that the judge intends to allow the jurors to ask questions. It is
also helpful to explain the acceptable procedure to counsel and the
jurors.
b. Other Potential Problems
One potential problem alluded to by Judge Thompson is that of
counsel's playing favorites with jurors who ask questions.5 2 By
concealing the identity of the questioner, Judge Thompson elimi-
nates that problem. Although the author's procedure does not con-
ceal the identity of the questioner, no instance has been
experienced in which any counsel has played favorites with jurors
who ask questions of a witness. Even if it were to become a prob-
lem, a warning to counsel-as gentle or stern as circumstances
suggested-should suffice to prevent a recurrence. This practice
would preserve the advantage of efficiency inherent in the use of
oral questions.
Some authorities voice a worry of counsel that objections to a
juror's question might prejudice the juror against the objecting
counsel.5 3 Once again, the apprehension should dissolve by care-
ful judicial management. If there is doubt about the propriety of a
question, the judge may call for a conference at the bench or
outside the presence of the jury. Because the judge initiates the
conference and the jurors do not know who, if anybody, has ob-
jected, none of the counsel is cast in the role of an obstructionist.
If the judge does not recognize a possible frailty in a question and
therefore, does not summon counsel for a conference, counsel may
simply request to confer with the judge at the bench. This discreet
manner of raising the issue lessens the risk of alienating a juror.
Additionally, a direct explanation by the judge to the jury of the
judge's decision not to require a witness to answer should draw
the juror's ire, if there is any, away from counsel, especially if the
explanation is not phrased in terms of a response to an objection.
51. See State v. Martinez, 7 Utah 2d 387, 389, 326 P.2d 102, 103-04 (1958).
52. Letter from the Honorable Bruce A. Thompson to the Center for Jury Stud-
ies, supra note 50, at 1.
53. See, e.g., White v. Little, 131 Okla. 132, 133-34, 268 P. 221, 222-23 (1928); see also
Jury Management, supra note 44, at 305.
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The author's experience is that jurors do not ask many ques-
tions but they usually ask good ones.
C. Summary
Whether jurors should be afforded a chance to ask questions of
witnesses during a trial has been left to the trial judge's discretion
in most cases. Usually, that discretion should be used to permit
the questions. The advantages are real, and the shortcomings are
either imaginary or easily avoidable. The key is careful control by
the judge. Counsel and jurors should be told of the acceptable pro-
cedure before the first witness testifies. Questions may be oral or
written, should be permitted only after counsel have finished with
a witness, should be directed to the judge, should be put to a wit-
ness only after the judge has tested them against the rules of evi-
dence and has conferred with counsel if any uncertainty of the
question's propriety exists, and should be followed by such addi-
tional queries by counsel as the jurors' questions make
appropriate.
IV. WRITTEN COPIES. OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS
FOR JURORS
A. Existing Legal Authority
Traditionally, at some time shortly after the conclusion of the
evidence in a case, instructions of law are orally given to the jury
by the court. Many judges provide only this oral guidance, and ju-
rors are left to their unaided memories about the law to be applied.
Some courts have sought to combat this problem by providing
the jury with some aid in the form of written instructions. Most
often, the written instructions are a typewritten form of the in-
structions orally read from the bench. Other courts have stopped
slightly short of written instructions and have required the court
reporter to read instructions back upon request 54 or have sent a
tape recording of the instructions into the jury room for playing
back as the jury desired.55
Giving the jury written aid has not always met with the ap-
proval of the appellate courts. In 1862 the Indiana Supreme Court
prohibited sending written copies into the jury room with the fol-
lowing language:
The principle is, that the jury shall take the law from the Court. The
mode in which the Court communicates with the jury is by addressing
them in open Court. The jury take the law from the Court through the ear.
54. See, e.g., Gregory v. United States, 365 F.2d 203, 206 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. de-
nied, 385 U.S. 1029 (1967).
55. See, e.g., Wagner v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 30, 49-50, 250 N.W.2d 331, 341-42 (1977).
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By so doing, they generally stand upon equality, because none but men
with hearing ears are competent jurors. In the juryroom, then, each de-
pends upon his own recollection of the instructions, and upon the impres-
sion they made upon him for their meaning, their construction; and, this
standing upon an equality, if they differ, they should come into Court, and,
in presence of the parties, let the Court be interpreter of its own instruc-
tions. But if; instead of this being done, the court sends the written in-
structions to the jury, inasmuch as jurors are not upon equality in their
ability to read and interpret writing, it puts it in the power of the sharp
ones on the jury to read, and become the interpreters for the Court, and
mislead their less skillful fellow-jurors. We think instructions should not
be sent to the juryroom, without consent of both parties.56
While the apprehension as to literacy or "equality in ... ability
to read and interpret writing" is not the problem today that it was
in 1862,57 courts more recently have found other grounds for re-
sisting the practice of submitting written instructions to the jury.
Some courts have discouraged the practice out of fear that jurors
will place undue emphasis on one portion of the instructions and
not read the jury charge as a whole.5 8 Other courts have taken a
similar tack and have discouraged the practice because they fear
that jurors will argue over points of law contained in the
instructions.5 9
Many jurisdictions, recognizing the usefulness of sending writ-
ten instructions into the jury room, have left the matter to the dis-
cretion of the trial judge.60 The federal courts' general policy-
leaving the matter to the discretion of the trial judge, unless a
party is prejudiced by the action-typifies this approach.61 Some
jurisdictions have gone somewhat further and have given the jury
the right to have written copies of the jury instructions sent into
56. Smith v. McMillen, 19 Ind. 391 (1862).
57. In 1970 the illiteracy rate in the United States was only about one percent of
the population. See 1981 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 1-22 (1981). In addition, the
educational attainment of individuals in the United States indicates that
reading and comprehending plainly drafted instructions should not present a
problem. By 1969, 52.4% of the population over 25 years of age had completed
high school and the median number of years of school completed was 12.1.
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1970 CENSUS OF THE POPULATION, EDUCATIONAL AT-
TANMENT 1-2 (1973). Among persons of ages 20 to 24, nearly 80% had com-
pleted high school. Id. If concerns about inability of jurors to understand
written instructions have any validity at the present time, it would thus seem
that their validity is declining.
58. See, e.g., United States v. Schilleci, 545 F.2d 519, 526 (5th Cir. 1977); Common-
wealth v. Baker, 466 Pa. 382, 396, 353 A.2d 406, 413-14 (1976).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Schilleci, 545 F.2d 514, 526 (5th Cir. 1977), Common-
wealth v. Baker, 466 Pa. 382, 396, 353 A.2d 406, 413-14 (1976).
60. See authorities cited in Annot., 91 A.LR3d 382, 391 (1979); Annot., 91 A.L.R.3d
336, 344 (1979).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Hicks, 619 F.2d 752, 758 (8th Cir. 1980); United States
v. Brighton Bldg. & Maintenance Co., 598 F.2d 1101, 1107-08 (7th Cir. 1979).
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the jury room. 62 When the right is provided by statute, it is not
always clear whether all or only part of the jury charge should be
sent into the jury room in written form.63
B. Should Written Copies of Jury Instructions Be Sent into the Jury
Room?
While there is disagreement, as noted above, the modern and
preferable view is that jurors should receive written copies of the
jury instructions for use during deliberations. Even the simplest
of cases factually can be complicated with respect to the law to be
applied. For example, most ordinary products liability cases are
probably brought on theories of strict liability, breach of warranty,
and negligence. Defenses of contributory negligence (compli-
cated, perhaps, by comparative negligence), assumption of risk,
and misuse of the product are typical. If a third-party action for
contribution or indemnity against a supplier of parts of the product
is joined, a seemingly simple injury case becomes mind-boggling
from the profusion of rules to be applied. The very simple solution
of providing written instructions is the common sense way of giv-
ing a jury guidance through the thicket.
Few lawyers would attempt to quote from memory the law ap-
plicable to a pending case. How then can lay jurors, untrained in
the law, be expected to remember the intricacies of the jury charge
without the aid of written copies? Lawyers and appellate courts
examine with a searching eye the precise wording of each instruc-
tion, but strangely suffer jurors either to apply the law by feel or to
ignore the fine points they cannot recall.
Just as lawyers and judges turn unhesitatingly to written
sources to understand the law, so jurors should be given a similar
courtesy. To give less is punishing to the jurors and a loss to the
cause of justice.
1. Advantages of the Practice
Studies indicate that persons receiving information orally-or
any other way-retain little of it for very long without some aid.64
If written jury instructions are available for the jurors to review,
they are a logical help65 because they supply the repetition that
62. See, e.g., Curtis v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 74 S.W.2d 255, 262 (Mo. App.
1934); Hollis v. Ferguson, 244 Or. 415, 422-23, 417 P.2d 989, 993 (1966); McElha-
ney v. State, 220 Tenn. 532, 534-35, 420 S.W.2d 643, 645 (1967).
63. See, e.g., Curtis v.-Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 74 S.W.2d 255 (Mo. App. 1934).
64. See supra note 22; B. SALEs, PERSPECTIVES iN LAw & PSYCHOLOGY, VOL. 1, 67-
68 (1977).
65. See Strawn & Munsterman, Helping Juries Handle Complex Cases, JUDICA-
TURE 444 (Mar.-Apr. 1982).
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memory needs. Particularly in complex cases presenting multiple
alternatives under the law, jurors cannot possibly remember the
details of the law contained in the charge.
Jurors are rarely brilliant and rarely stupid, but they are
treated as both at once. They are thought by some to be able to
stick on their minds, from a single reading, a clear version of law so
complicated that lawyers strain to grasp it; yet, they are deemed
too incompetent to be trusted with a written version of the same
law.
Jurors are human beings, like the rest of us. They are our
friends and neighbors. They need what all of us need. They get
their understanding as we all get it. If an oral presentation is supe-
rior to a written one and is sufficient in itself, why does not every
judge listen only to an oral recitation of each side's version of the
law, read none, and then make a decision or render an opinion or
make a charge to a jury? Why read briefs at all? Who honestly
supposes that jurors without written instructions understand the
location of the subtle lines they must draw? Has any literate juror
ever told a judge that the juror would rather have no written
instruction?
It is apparent that in most instances the choice is between deci-
sion by understanding and decision by hunch. The latter should
be unacceptable by any modem standard.
2. Problems and Precautions
a. Procedural Concerns
Once a cont has decided to submit written copies of the jury
instructions to the jury for deliberations, a number of procedural
choices confront the court. One matter which often occurs in case
law is to decide when written copies will be given to the jury. The
matter meets with a diversity of response, as described above.6 6
, Although courts may send only a portion of the instructions
into the jury room in written form,67 the author prefers to send a
complete set. Selectivity would seem to be counter to the usual
urging that instructions be considered as a whole.
Some courts have used written summaries instead of the verba-
tim instructions.68 The author sends photocopies of the instruc-
tions actually read to the jury from the bench. If instructions are
written in plain language, it is difficult to understand a need for
summaries. In addition, summaries may amount to unnecessary
66. See supra notes 54-63 and accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., People v. Medrano, 101 Mich. App. 577, 583-84, 300 N.W.2d 636, 638
(1980); People v. Maye, 58 A.D.2d 782, 783, 396 N.Y.S.2d 381, 382 (1977).
68. See, e.g., State v. Frank, 284 N.C. 137, 146-47, 200 S.E.2d 169, 176 (1973).
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additional effort, when a plainly drafted instruction would accom-
plish the same objective. Summaries also introduce the risk of not
being true reflections of the full instructions.
The author prefers to provide one photocopy for each juror. Al-
though this may present some difficulty for a court with a limited
staff,69 the extra effort places the jurors on equal footing. No sign
is evident and none has been produced from many posttrial confer-
ences with jurors by the author that this practice tends to lengthen
or complicate deliberations.
b. Other Potential Problems
Although in some systems, such as the federal court, literacy in
English is a prerequisite to jury service, the problem of illiterate
jurors may not be a simple one in other systems. Should the trial
judge detect that one or more of the jurors in a case are not liter-
ate, that fact should be weighed with other factors. Of course,
when copies of instructions are sent in with the jury, they should
be clean, unmarked, and legible.70
C. Summary
It is both helpful and advisable to send written copies of the
jury charge to the jury room with the jury. Understandability will
be markedly increased in most cases. It is also a good practice to
provide each juror with a copy of the instructions to follow when
the instructions are being read aloud by the judge and for use in
deliberations, if adequacy of staff and equipment make it feasible.
V. CONCLUSION
When a judge supposes that he or she knows that jurors are
incapable of taking notes-though jurors themselves do not know
it and students from high school forward do it daily-honest in-
quiry prompts asking why. When a judge decides that jurors are
incompetent to put questions to fill factual voids they perceive-
though jurors alone must decide the factual issues in face of the
voids-one is pushed to ask why. When a judge denies to jurors a
69. See STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY § 4.6(d), Commentary 120 (Tent
Draft 1968).
70. Although it would seem reasonable to suppose that written copies of instruc-
tions always would be clean and unmarked, many courts have sent copies
containing partially obliterated words, underlined or italicized words, or
unintelligible writing. Such practices are undesirable and pose problems on
appeal. See Annot., 91 A.L.R.3d 382, 402-12 (1979); Annot., 91 A.L.R.3d 336, 354-
64 (1979); Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 501 (1966) and authorities cited therein.
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means to remember rules of law they cannot otherwise recall-but
are sworn to follow-a fair question asks why.
A realistic approach to trial improvement, designed to reduce
distrust of juries by the legal community and enhance the jury's
factfinding product, is to allow greater juror participation in the
trial process. This Article has advocated, therefore, permitting ju-
rors to take notes, allowing jurors to ask questions to be put to wit-
nesses, and furnishing jurors with copies of written instructions.
The practices proposed are both safe, once it is realized that the
risks associated with them are easily avoidable by the trial judge,
and sensible, once it is seen that assumptions of juror inadequacy
have been "pick[ed] ... out of the wind and air."71
71. Carl Sandburg, Wilderness.
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